Caucasian Politics

Abkhazia is claiming that an L-39 shot down the Georgian drone. The video clearly shows a Mig 29. The giveaway feature is the twin vertical stabilisers at the rear of the plane. The L-39 only has one.

A Russian military official denied a Russian Mig was in the area at the time.

Given that the bomb did not explode, and given the history, it seems to me more likely that Russia did not attack Georgia - but that Georgia planned the whole thing. Georgia would have the means and the motive to create this situation - it seems far too strange for two Russian jets to drop a malfunctioning bomb on another sovereign state for no apparent reason.

The ructions over South Ossetia continue. What is going on?

The latest clash is over South Ossetia, one of two Georgian regions that fought their way to unofficial secession in the 1990s. There have been fisticuffs and tit-for-tat blockades between Georgian troops and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Last week, Georgia’s parliament, accusing Russia of annexing its territory, called for Russian troops to get out. (As in Abkhazia, the other enclave, most South Ossetians now have Russian passports.) In retaliation for visa requirements imposed on Russian troops, the Russian embassy in Tbilisi stopped issuing visas to Georgians.

There are two interpretations of this vitriol. One is that, accustomed to brinkmanship as both sides are, neither really means it. Both understand the need to play to a domestic gallery. That may be true of some Georgians—diplomats point out there were no ultimatums in the Ossetian resolution—but feelings in the Kremlin seem authentically bilious. Hence the other possibility, that the Georgians are miscalculating.

Like other small countries, Georgia is used to seeing its fate decided elsewhere. Zurab Noghaideli, the prime minister, says his government knows its problems must be solved by itself above all; but its strategy seems to be to attract as much attention as possible in America and Europe. That may be based on an inflated idea of how willing outsiders are to take up Georgia’s cause. They may be even less willing should the imperfections of Mr Saakashvili’s regime become still more pronounced (even though Ms Zourabichvili’s talk of “creeping totalitarianism” is exaggerated).

Ms Zourabichvili says that, should disappointment with the current course set in, the paradoxical outcome might be to drive Georgia back towards Russia. Meanwhile, the Kremlin could make life even tougher. Russian officers say that if they leave (unlikely, at least for now), there could be a new conflict in South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, who visited neighbouring Azerbaijan this week, has compared Georgia’s enclaves to Kosovo.

Given Russia’s problems in Chechnya, self-determination might seem an odd principle for the Kremlin to espouse; but their problem, say the Russians, is terrorists, not separatists. “Some people just don’t know where the borders of the Russian Federation end,” says Mr Saakashvili. Unfortunately for him, the status quo in the enclaves—power to make trouble, with no responsibility—suits Russia nicely. The risk is that war may come to seem the only way forward.

The caucasus destabilising poses a huge threat to Western interests too. Any war, even small scale, would have serious regional affects. The mix of Iranian gas and oil, Azeri oil, Caspian oil, the BTC oil pipeline, Turkey, Chechnya, ethnic and religious strife - it’s a potent mix indeed.

Amongst people that I have met from the former Soviet Union, most especially those from Georgia, Stalin is a figure that is applauded in Soviet history. I have had very interesting conversations with Georgians about the legacy of Stalin, and most say that what Russia needs now is another ‘man of steel’, to bring the country back into line. They tend not to beat around the bush when it comes to some of Stalin’s exploits. Of the 1944 deportation of almost the entire Chechen population to Siberia Georgians seem to have little sympathy, an Orthodox country surrounded by Islamic ones lends little support for Islamic populations. And of all the other people exterminated by Stalin, Geogians usually seem to say that they deserved it as they were ‘criminals’.

It all makes this article in Foreign Affairs more interesting. I have puzzled over the lack of resentment for Stalin among all of the former Soviet Union, Sarah Mendelson and Theordore Gerber write about polls carried out in the former Soviet Union over the last few years, it makes for startling reading, especially among younger people:

The rule, therefore, seems to be thorough ambivalence about Stalin among Russia’s youth. Although some people might take comfort in the finding that hard-core Stalinism is not widespread, such ambivalence is itself disturbing. It suggests that Russia badly needs a systematic de-Stalinization campaign — a need that is growing increasingly urgent. Our survey data suggest that young people’s attitudes toward Stalin are, if anything, becoming more positive: in 2005, nearly 19 percent of respondents said they would definitely or probably vote for him, up from 13 percent in 2003 and 2004.

The article suggests solutions, education being the main one, but in Putin’s Russia this appears to be a problem:

Western cheerleaders of Russian President Vladimir Putin are likely to dismiss positive Russian attitudes toward Stalin as a minor growing pain or a speed bump on the country’s road to democracy — just as they downplay the carnage in Chechnya; the festering, potentially explosive conflict throughout the North Caucasus; the Kremlin’s blatant suppression of independent television outlets and nongovernmental organizations that dare to challenge its official line; the sorry state of Russia’s disintegrating military; the predatory and ineffective police; and the massive corruption at all levels of Russian government.

Such willful blindness is dangerous. But so is the opposite perspective of some pessimistic Russia-watchers, who take Russians’ ambivalence toward Stalin as evidence of an authoritarian gene embedded somewhere in the Russian character. In fact, the Russian public’s attitude toward Stalin is neither innocuous (and thus not worth changing) nor inherent (and thus immutable). Our surveys suggest that Russian attitudes toward Stalin owe not to any instinctive authoritarianism, but to the fact that no concerted, effective de-Stalinization campaign has ever been conducted in the country. On the contrary, myths and illusions about Russia’s great dictator have been allowed to survive, and even thrive, often with tacit (if not explicit) encouragement from the government.

Will Stalin be rememberd by his people as a great and wise leader, or as a murderous tyrant?

It could be political or criminal, you never know in this region:

Near-simultaneous blasts rocked three slot machine halls in the Russian Caucasus town Vladikavkaz on Thursday, killing two people, the local Emergencies Ministry said.

There was no word on what had caused the blasts in the gaming parlors, which are popular across Russia after gambling was outlawed in Soviet times.

“Thirteen people are injured and two people have died,” a spokesman said.

Russian news agencies reported most casualties were young people in their 20s and there were some children among the injured.

Vladikavkaz is in North Ossetia, the same region where Chechen militants took a school in Beslan hostage in September 2004, resulting in the deaths of 331 people, more than half of them children.

What would have been the consequences had the grenade gone off?

A Georgian man has been sentenced to life in prison for throwing a grenade at a rally attended by US President George W Bush in Tbilisi last May.

Vladimir Arutyunian was found guilty on charges including terrorism, treason, attempted assassination and the killing of a police officer, the judge said.

The grenade landed 30m (100ft) from Mr Bush and the Georgian leader, who were standing behind bullet-proof glass.

Rather large protests indeed, but not as many as the opposition expected - they say thanks to police intimidation.

The government of President Ilham Aliyev allowed the opposition to stage a three-hour rally in the outskirts of the capital, Baku. Election officials have ordered re-runs in two districts and one recount.

About 15,000 protesters attended the march and rally, many wearing or waving orange flags in a reference to the success of the “orange revolution” that brought President Victor Yushchenko to power in Ukraine after disputed elections.

The numbers fell far short of the 30,000 to 50,000 the opposition had hoped for.

This could fester.

Elections in Azerbaijan have led to the reinstatement of the existing leader Ilham Aliev. It appears though, that the elections were far from fair. It is what you might expect from Azerbaijan. The Economist reports:

One campaign has involved decrees on electoral propriety from Ilham Aliev, Azerbaijan’s president, the open registration of candidates, plans for exit-polling and the release of political prisoners. Beneath these niceties, however, lies another campaign that has alarmed foreign election and human-rights observers. This one features the beating and detention of opposition candidates and their supporters, media bias, and bizarre allegations of a coup plot that followed a mysteriously aborted homecoming by an exiled opposition leader. This election may yet be judged to have been little cleaner than the rigged presidential poll in 2003, when Mr Aliev succeeded his father Heidar, a Soviet-era boss who ran the country again for the last decade of his life.

Some facts on Azerbaijan for general interest:

Azerbaijan has more people (8m), and most are Muslims. It is in a rough neighbourhood: to the north is Dagestan, an anarchic region of Russia; to the south, Iran. It lost a chunk of its territory in a war with Armenia in the 1990s, and the two countries may yet fight another. Above all, it has oil and gas: new pipelines will soon carry both from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. And, like its election, Azerbaijan has two faces. It is a proud, booming nation with a westernised elite and a glamorous capital, Baku; it is also grotesquely corrupt, beset by clan rivalries, its bureaucrats fattening on backhanders while 40% of the country lives in poverty.

Trouble in the Caucasus, Kabardino-Balkaria is one of the may enclaves in the region, as this Economist graphic shows.

Indeed the Economist piece back in February discussed the instability of the region.

IN ANY other European country, the carnage would have caused horror. But ten years of war in Chechnya have inured most Russians to the fates of desperadoes such as the obscure Islamist group that two weeks ago holed up in an apartment in Nalchik, the capital of the north Caucasian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. A three-day siege ended bloodily: the apartment was gutted, and its seven occupants, alleged perpetrators of a murderous attack on a government agency in December, were all killed.

Still, the location of this particular last stand was troubling. Kabardino-Balkaria had until recently been a patch of relative calm in Russia’s poorest, angriest and most complex region. So too, until last October, had seemed Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria’s western neighbour. Then seven businessmen were killed, and their bodies thrown down a mine. The son-in-law of the republic’s president was implicated in the murders, and a mob stormed the presidential headquarters in Cherkessk, the capital.

And indeed it warned back then:

In Ingushetia and North Ossetia, people whisper about unknown bearded men turning up at mosques. Mass unemployment helps to make militancy seem like a good career option. But while the threat may be growing, only a small minority dream of a north Caucasian caliphate. Many of the region’s problems have nothing to do with either religion or ethnicity.

The big risk is simply that more and more of the north Caucasus may slip into lawlessness and drift out of Moscow’s orbit. After his meddling in Ukraine, pundits talked of Mr Putin’s plans to reconstitute the Russian empire. But, in a sense, Russia is already its own empire. The possibility that it may one day crumble as the Soviet Union did is Mr Putin’s central fear. The neglect of the north Caucasus may eventually lead to that fear’s realisation.

We will have to wait and see who is behind the latest attacks.

A blogger, either Georgian or of Georgian descent, living in Germany, so impressed with my coverage of Georgian politics was kind enough to leave a comment on my blog.

In turn I had a browse around, despite my lack of German. I find some lovely photos of Georgia, and this fascinating study into the just completed BTC pipeline.

Isn’t the blogosphere wonderful?

Depressing news indeed:

A top human rights official in the Russian-backed administration in Chechnya says there are more than 50 mass graves in the troubled republic.

Nurdi Nukhazhiyev told the BBC that tens of thousands of civilians had “disappeared” since 1999.

Whither the international outcry?

So it was finally finished this week, though it will take 6 months for the oil to go from one end to the other. At full capacity the pipeline will provide 1% of the world’s oil needs. The Economist notes the significance:

The BTC pipeline, though the most expensive option for exporting Caspian oil, was backed by America because it avoided Russia, thereby reducing the dependence of the Caucasus and Central Asia on Russian pipelines. The pipeline also provided an opportunity to bolster regional economies that the West is courting, especially those of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, a NATO ally, and build support for America in the region. Georgia’s location gives it a “strategic importance far beyond its size�?, according to America’s State Department.

Upgrading an alternative route through Georgia to Supsa on the Black Sea would have made for a far shorter (and cheaper) pipeline. But Turkey complained that it would lead to an unsustainable level of shipping passing through the Bosporus Strait that bisects Istanbul. At Washington’s urging, the BTC pipeline wended its complex way through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. However, some critics of the pipeline point out that the oil revenues provided to Azerbaijan will help to prop up the country’s autocratic and corrupt regime. And environmentalists have complained that the pipe slices through a national park in Georgia.

I failed to give sufficient space towards the Bush visit to Georgia - but I have been looking back at some of the coverage.

Bush’s warning to Putin, his host in Red Square only 24 hours before at the 60th anniversary celebration of the defeat of Nazi Germany, was focused on two separatist enclaves within Georgia’s borders - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - that are aligned with Russia.

Earlier in the day, at a joint news conference with Saakashvili in the Parliament building, Bush embraced the Georgian president’s plan that the enclaves become autonomous and self-governing, but not independent. He approvingly said that Saakashvili “wants the country to remain intact.”

Bush’s words were immediately criticized by the president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, who told the Interfax news agency that “the Abkhaz people have already opted for an independent state at a referendum and this choice should be respected.”

Bush took a careful stance on the biggest conflict right now between Russia and Georgia, the two Russian military bases on Georgian soil that the Georgians want removed. The two countries are in negotiations, but Saakashvili boycotted the 60th anniversary celebration in Red Square to protest a lack of progress. Bush said at the news conference that he had spoken to Putin about the matter.

“He reminded me that there is an agreement in place - a 1999 agreement,” Bush said. “He said that the Russians want to work with the government to fulfill their obligations in terms of that agreement. I think that’s a commitment that’s important for the people of Georgia to hear. It shows there’s grounds to work to get this issue resolved.”

Some discussion is also happening over on Irish Eagle. I tend to agree with Peter on this one, Georgia is important to US interests - NATO or no NATO. Energy supplies from the Caspian that do not go through volatile central Asia, or Russia, but instead via friendly Georgia, Azerbaijan, and NATO ally Turkey are, in my estimation at least, hugely important. Besides that Georgia is in a strategically important area, gateway to Europe and the Middle East - its only a 200km trek to the Iranian border (where believe it or not many people speak Georgian).

I reckon Georgia is important enough for the US to maintain a presence there almost indefinately - whether it comes to war with Russia or not is hard to say - but Georgia is certainly seeking a security guarantee in the form of NATO membership. The regions of Abkazia and Ossetia are certainly a problem for Saaskashvili - he has more or less staked his Presidency on bringing them back into the fold. The Russian airbases in question are perhaps more important to Russia than it lets on, the same bases were some of the most important during the Cold War.

Georgia is getting alot of attention lately because of the Bush visit. Natalia Antelava for the BBC in Tblisi writes a rather uncritical report of the visit. Many Georgians I have spoken to are not only pissed off at the Bush visit, but are angry at Saakashvili. Natalia notes:

Yet Georgians do not seem to mind the fuss. “It’s great that he is coming. For a man like that, of such political prestige to come to our small country, that’s really outstanding. I and all my friends want to go and hear him speak,” said a student, Avtandil Murvanidze. “And we are getting a whole new beautiful city!” he added.

Is it me or does that make Georgians sound like uncritical plebs? Nowhere in the article are criticsms of Saakashvili or Bush - criticisms many Georgians are making. As one of my friends noted:

“Pash-ole von Bush. Pash-ole von Saakashvili, chen bozo-shvili”.

That’s actually two languages - ‘Fuck off Bush’. ‘Fuck off Saakashvili’ in Russian. And then ‘chen bozo-shvili’ is ‘you son-of-a-bitch’ in Georgian.

Earlier this month, Eamonn put together a post along with a map of the Caucasus. He referred to an article in the Economist, a 3 page piece if I remember correctly, in which the details of criminal activity in the region were detailed. It is indeed a volatile region, but Georgia is definately a country I will be visiting. Whether I travel into neighbouring regions, or even the notorious Pankisi Gorge inside Georgia, is another question.

In recent weeks the blogosphere has been rife with sentiment surrounding the various demonstrations in countries that are not known for the democratic regimes. Georgia is often used as the first example, at least in the post-Soviet bloc of countries. Since then we have had Ukraine and now Kyrgyzstan. What many commentators are saying is that these demonstrations and revoltions are a product of Bush’s foreign policy, stemming in part from his invasion of Iraq.

Cheerleading such as that over at Instapundit leads to simplification - even down to the names of the revolutions - the ‘Rose’ revolution in Georgia, or the Orange revolutions elsewhere, or the ‘Cedar’ revolution in Lebanon. What I have found lacking thus far in these commentaries is a sense of perspective or scale.

It is barely a year since the Rose Revolution in Georgia, that put Mikhail Saakashvili in power. His regime is lauded as a center for democracy in an otherwise troubled region, and he is lauded as a Western-style statesman, keen on democratic reform. The US has been active in the country, training its troops, and contributing large sums of money to the economy. Of course there is the hugely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, which provides a valuable strategic alternative to pumping oil through Putin’s Russia.

But lest we forget, it is just over a year. A blip on the calendar. Many are too quick to judge, these events in Georgia and Ukraine, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan are in their infancy. If history has thought me anything it is that when events such as these happen, people are inclined to rush to either claim credit, or to say it reflects a wider thirst for democratic ideals first coined in Europe.

Only in 20 years will we be able to look back on any of these events and see their collective effect on global politics. Sure we can speculate now on why these events take place, but it will only be with the benefit of hindsight that we will actually be able to make a true assessment of what actually happened.

Take Georgia as an example. It is so often cited now as an example for peaceful democratic reform, that nobody dare say that something could go wrong. But is everything as rosey as we think it might be?

It appears that in the minds of Western pundits that once democracy has taken hold in a country such as Georgia, once a pro-Western reformer takes power, that it will be a natural steady road to Westernisation/democratisation. Drezner noted:

…events in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Georgia, are making me wonder if maybe, just maybe, we’re at the beginning of the fourth wave of democratization.

But is this the case?

I have over the last number of months, I have tried to detail reforms in that country, many of which are supported by the West. The inclusion of Georgian troops in coalition forces in Iraq is seen as keeping good relations with the US. The liberalisation of economics, crackdowns on corruption, these are all seen by the West as great endeavours for a former Soviet state, and indeed home of Stalin.

But everything is not going that great in Georgia. Just over a year into Saakashvili’s presidency and there is huge discontent with his leadership. There have been calls for him to resign, or for another revolution to take place. His problem is that he is seen as too Western. Georgian people are not Western, and many idealise the Soviet days, and desire a return to Communism. The most recent decisions by Saakashvili have proven hugely unpopular.

He has decided to ask all foreign embassies in Georgia to no longer give travel or work visas to Georgians. Remember that money coming from ex-patriots is Georgia’s lifeline to hard currency, without the country would go bankrupt. Last week Saakashvili announced that a new Bank Holiday would be held on a Muslim Holy day, in order to recognise Georgia’s tiny Muslim population. Both of these events have proved enormously controversial, with many calling for Saakashvili to be removed. My own sources tell me that discontent has led to outright anger and hatred for the President, with many saying he should either be killed or removed.

These are mere examples, but the point remains - democracy is never plain sailing even in well established ones in the West. But in countries such as these democracy is far from assured, nor is the desire for it certain. If in 5 years time we can look back and say that Bush was right in his foreign policy, with successfully spreading democracy then well and good, but we should not be judging these efforts until well after his successor has left office.

Jonathan Steele writes in the Guardian about Europe’s silence on the situation in Chechnya.

In short, Europe is replacing its old policy of publicly denouncing Russia over Chechnya. At the current session of the UN Human Rights Commission, the EU has not proposed a resolution this year. But, diplomats argue, the silence is not motivated by cynicism or “condemnation fatigue”, let alone agreement with Moscow that Chechnya is a front in the war on international terror. It is part of a new policy of constructive engagement.

The hope is that low-key offers of help by European governments, and support at the Council of Europe for Chechnya’s political forces to start a dialogue, could have a better chance of success. The policy is worth trying, but the risks are enormous. If it turns out that Russia is merely coopting the EU behind its brutal tactics of “Chechenisation”, the new strategy must be dropped.

Did lots of reading this evening folks, and now I’m too tired to blog. But the list of stuff to blog grows in my bookmarks…

I have noted Eamonn’s interest in Caucasian politics, and read the Economist article he refers to. I have more information from the region that has not made it to the media as yet, at least from what I can see.

In some chilling photos, the killing of Aslan Maskhadov, notorious Chechen leader, has been confirmed. The celebrations by Russia’s Dumas will likely be short-lived, Shamil Basayev will probably replace Maskhadov, and may already be planning retaliation.

Speculation is rife. Zurab Zhvania is dead, along with Raul Usupov. If one wanted to take full control of the Georgian government there are three posts that hold the most power. Mikhail Saakashvili would be a prime suspect if, along with the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, Nino Burjanadze, also ended up dead. It is interesting to note that the BBC reports “Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has said he is taking charge of the government following the death of his prime minister on Wednesday.” Georgian media reports that

Saakashvili, who has personally assumed the leadership of the executive, will have to appoint new prime minister within a week after consulting with the parliament’s factions. The candidate will have to nominate new cabinet members and introduce them to parliament for approval within ten days. According to the constitution, the cabinet is automatically dissolved in case the prime minister stops fulfilling his duties with any reason.

I think this will be a wait and see, who is appointed will be interesting.

Zhvania was a man who turned coats many times. What is strange about his death was how strange his death was. A faulty heater causing monoxide poisoning just doesn’t sound right. Both are likely to have been wealthy, both would have had to have been asleep alone in, what I’m told, was a modern apartment. In order for them both to die a host of factors would have had to come together.

Some in Georgia suspect Saakashvili, known to be a cunning politician. Similar methods were used by previous leaders, including Shevardnadze, in order to gain almost total power. Other suspects include the Ossetians - though a sophisticated assassination by smugglers is unlikely. Usupov was a senior politician in the area surrounding contested South Ossetia, and following the car bomb in Gori this week, some might say the points the finger at Ossetians.

Some may say the FSB, directed by Putin, could carry out such a killing, and make it appear accidental. What would Putin have to gain? Destabilising Georgia is an idea for him, since disputes over Abkazia are ongoing. The massive B-T-C oil pipeline going through Georgia is due to be completed this year, a pipeline Moscow was never happy with, since it took away valuable oil transit revenues from their own Caspian wells.

However it should be noted that Zhvania was in favour of selling a gas pipeline to a Russian company, Gazprom. Something that others in Georgia, including Nino Burjanadze, were keenly against. So who would gain by a killing a proponent of selling strategic pipelines to Russia…some countries come to mind, but I could get bogged down in a host of conspiracy theories.

There appear to be simply too many reasons as to why this was not simply an accident, and I think to discount the possibility that they were murdered would be naive.

I am watching events in Georgia closely, there must be more to this than first appears. More soon.

Some readers may remember that back in September I wrote a post about an interview Roisin Duffy did on RTE Radio with Salih Brandt, former European spokesman for the Chechen government. It appears that Salih himself has responded to what I wrote. Ah the wonders of blogging and search engine ranking. Salih notes:

I can fully understand this gentleman�s view and the outrage he feels.

That was entirely the point of my making the statement! In order to draw attention to the fact that when people in situations like this are labelled as Muslims nobody raises an eyebrow, but if the word �Jew� appears in it then the response is exactly as above.

What the writer has also failed to do is bring in the context in which this statement was made. I was specifically addressing the fact that this may have been conducted by Muslims, but it is not Islamic, just as the people who have ripped welath out of Russia are in large part Jewish it does not mean that the behavious is Jewish. So he has in fact very kindly supported my view.

I also stressed that while this kind of terrorism is called �Islamic Terrorism� that conducted by the IRA, ETA, the Oklahoma bombing is not called �Christian Terrorism� nor is the killing of 100,000 civilians in Iraq by teh UK and US forces called �Christian genocide”.

So once again I thank the writer for, by the extistential action of his response, for proving my point.

However, I did not say that all Jews are tax dodgers, just as I am sure he would not say �all muslims are terrorists”�..or would he?! Rather weakens his point I feel by dropping to a rather feeble and intellectually purile line.

By the way, you forgot Mr Abramovich in your list!

Thank you and good luck with you work.

Mikhail Saakashvili, President of Georgia, had an article in the IHT last week. He marks a year since the Rose revolution with an update on Georgia’s progress.

When my administration took office, three provinces of Georgia were unstable and viewed themselves as independent enclaves: Adzharia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The first step toward reunification came in May, when I worked with reform-minded citizens in Adzharia, near the Black Sea, to force out a thoroughly corrupt autocrat. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we are working hard to achieve reunification through peaceful means. We have asked international organizations to do more. Our autonomy offer to South Ossetia is unprecedented and we will work with the international community for a resolution. Abkhazia remains a more difficult task. But we are working assiduously - with those in the region and our neighbor Russia - and I am confident we will peacefully heal the wounds of the Georgian nation.

Economically, we have initiated a privatization effort that would make Milton Friedman proud, selling everything the government had no business owning in the first place. Why, in the 21st century, should a government own hotels? It shouldn’t, and our government no longer does. Moreover, we are completely overhauling our tax code, replacing it with a people-friendly, pro-growth system that relies on a simple flat tax.

We seek to build economic, cultural and security relations with our friends in the South Caucasus and around the globe. Our close relationship with America is one of our proudest accomplishments. Georgia is a steadfast partner in the war on terror and our capabilities have been enhanced by American training and equipment. For this, we are extremely grateful.

We have contributed troops to Afghanistan and the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. This month we increased our troop levels in Iraq fivefold. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently approved our military reform plans - a critical step on the path to integration in NATO structures. We are also taking the necessary political, legal and economic steps to make our goal of joining the European Union a reality.

As we celebrate a year of our new democracy, I am deeply proud of my people, my government and my country. Yes, we have a long way to go, but the path is clear. For every day that we reduce corruption and crime, we bolster the hopes of every Georgian. For every day that we see Georgians from all over the world returning home, we inspire the dreams of a new generation. We also see that the message of our revolution - that democracy is universal and can be successful in post-Soviet states - is widely spreading in the region.

Many Georgians remain sceptical. The pace is agonisingly slow. One thing that strikes me about Georgians is that even if they spent 10 years working abroad, they would always go home. They have a love for their country I have not seen in many other cultures. I hope Mikhail is right - and Georgia’s economy does pick up. This piece by Kathy Lally from earlier in the week provides a good counter balance to Saakashvili ’s piece.

The events in the Ukraine are certainly interesting ones. The split in the country is evident, with large tracts of the Eastern regions supporting closer ties with Russia through Viktor Yanukovych. Curiously, or perhaps not surprisingly, the blogosphere largely supports the pro-Western Victor Yushchenko.

Perhaps that’s because we are Westerners ourselves. What is curious to me is the conversations I have with Georgian, Russian and yes, Ukrainian people. Despite their obvious dislike for Putin, my Georgian friends are inclined to support Yanukovych - simply because they don’t want to see yet another Soviet-era country move towards NATO and the EU. It should be noted though that Georgians are great lovers of Josef “Iron man” Dzhugashvili, he was afterall from Gory, Georgia. Russians seem to be plainly in support of Putin’s efforts to ensure Ukraine’s continuing close ties with Moscow, and too fear NATO expanion. While my Ukrainian friends are split either way.

To me what is plain is that no matter what people think, a fair election did not take places. Have another one - and if the majority favour moving closer to Russia - so be it. I hope my liking for liberal democracy does not make my too ethno-centric in my views.

I can’t keep up with events in the Ukraine, but Dan Drezner has been blogging on it non-stop.

The very dangerous words have finally been said - the Ukraine could be on the brink of very serious civil strife. The situation seems set to escalate, as the US refuses to recognise the result as legitimate. Now both parties have upped the ante :

Calling for a general strike, Mr Yushchenko told a vast crowd of supporters in the central Independence Square that Ukraine was on the brink of a “civil conflict”.

Mr Kuchma, who backs Mr Yanukovych, denounced the opposition protests and warned civil war “could well become a reality at the present time”.

If war does break out, how would it affect already strained Russo-European relations? In my humble opinion the election was indeed rigged, and Putin is backing the man who wants Ukraine to move further east rather than further West. If Putin can engineer this kind of behaviour, I have no doubt he is intimately involved, then how will approach continuing tensions in the Ossetia/Abkhazia disputes?

Any civil conflict in this region will have huge implications, and could well draw in a number of other countries. Reports and rumours also suggest that Russian Special Forces, the famed Alpha, who took Kabul in under 2 hours during the Soviet invasion in December 1979, are now in the Ukraine - dressed as Ukrainian soldiers.

Ukraine has 50 million people - a significant number. More CIA facts are here.

More ructions in one of Georgia’s breakaway regions :

Russia may intervene in Georgia’s breakaway province of Abkhazia to protect its interests there, if a post- election crisis escalates further.

In response, Georgia has called on the international community to protect the country’s sovereignty.

A decade-long row between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia is getting worse.

One person is reported to have died in clashes on Friday between government and opposition supporters in the Abkhaz regional capital Sukhumi.

Moscow has accused the opposition in Abkhazia of attempting to overthrow the Russian-backed government and has pledged to intervene if the crisis isn’t resolved.

Georgia has responded angrily, accusing Moscow of violating Georgia’s sovereignty with unacceptable statements.

The dispute follows Friday’s rally, during which supporters of the Abkhaz opposition leader, Sergey Bagapsh, stormed government buildings in Sukhumi.

They later agreed to give control of the buildings back to state security.

But Moscow said it holds the opposition fully responsible for the crisis.

Charles King has been doing some good essays on the problems in Georgia for Foreign Affairs. Elections in the breakaway region of Abkhazia have brought Georgia back into the news recently. It should be noted that the Kremlin’s man is likely to win in what Georgia sees as illegitamate elections.

Raul Khadzhimba is seen as Moscow’s man in a region where Russian influence and investment is increasing steadily, despite an official economic blockade. For this unrecognised strip of land, Russia’s support has provided a lifeline. “Abkhazia will continue in the same direction it’s been heading, for full independence”, Mr Khadzhimba declared, emerging from the polling booth. “Unity with Georgia is a thing of the past, now we look to Russia for economic integration, but as an independent state.”

But as King notes in an update in a Foreign Affairs entry, the situation is far from clear cut:

Tensions have also been rising in Abkhazia, the region along the northwestern coast which, like South Ossetia, has been functionally independent for more than ten years. President Saakashvili has vowed to block any ships from docking at Abkhazia’s ports and to try to prevent Russian tourists from visiting the attractive beaches (a mainstay of the secessionist republic’s economy). The Georgian government has repeatedly argued that it is seeking a peaceful solution to these crises and that any violence has been solely the result of provocation by Russia and the secessionists. Yet it was in precisely these conditions that the disastrous wars of the early 1990s began: as attempts by the central government to push its case for reintegrating regions that had already de facto seceded.

President Saakashvili has often argued that these unrecognized states are little more than Russia’s stooges — levers that Moscow can use to keep Georgia weak at a time when the country has become a solid partner of the United States. That understates the complexity of the situation, however. Especially in Abkhazia, local citizens are united in their desire not to be part of Georgia. They won a war for independence in the early 1990s, and they have spent more than a decade building something that looks like a real state. Georgia’s territorial woes are thus not simply about rebuilding a single country. They are about trying to unite several independent ones. So far, however, neither Georgia nor the international community has been able to offer anything attractive enough to woo the South Ossetians and Abkhaz into a unified country. As recent events have shown, when Georgia flexes its muscles, the secessionists are simply reminded of why they fought — and, with Russia’s help, won — the civil wars of the early 1990s.

While many might support the right to self-determination of the Abkhaz people, it should be noted that up until the war in the early 90’s, most of the region were Georgians. As this BBC entry notes:

At the time of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, less than a fifth of the people of Abkhazia were ethnic Abkhaz while the rest of the population was made up largely of Georgians.

When Georgia became independent, supporters of a break with Tbilisi in favour of independence and closer ties with Russia became more vociferous. Tension rose and in 1992 Georgia sent troops to enforce the status quo.

In late 1993, they were driven out amidst fierce fighting. Several thousand people were killed. About 250,000 Georgians became refugees and are still unable to return. Most of those who remained have since left too.

I can see why Georgians might be pretty pissed off.

Victor Erofeyev sounds alot like John Waters in the Irish Times last week, and Mark Steyn in the Spectator last Thursday.

Where does Basayev end and Al Qaeda begin? A separatist and a fundamentalist are two very different things. The first demands political separation; the second declares holy war against us. But the separatist Basayev no longer exists. A massacre of children worthy of Herod is not a coded invitation to peace negotiations. Basayev’s message can no longer be reduced to vengeance, an idea that presumes we call it quits when all the scores have been settled.

The military dispute over Chechen sovereignty, morally impossible for Russia to win from the very beginning, has mutated, leaving none of the old certainties in place. Like Osama bin Laden’s attack on the United States, Basayev’s attack on the school signifies the start here of the Third World War of which the whole of Western civilization is so rightly afraid, which it tries with all its might to postpone, which it even tries to ignore.

Anatol Lieven, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington has a good piece about Chechnya in the IHT. He believes that the West needs a new strategy for Chechnya and that this strategy should have 3 vital components:

The first would be directed towards Moscow, and would echo our approach to Turkey, India and other countries which have fought similar conflicts against secessionist and terrorist forces. It would express unqualified support for Russia’s territorial integrity and for its struggle against the terrorists.

However, it would combine this with demands that the Russian state take much stronger action against abuses by the military, that international observers be allowed into Chechnya and that the Russian government launch a much more broadly based and democratic political initiative. This would include both the holding of democratic parliamentary elections in Chechnya and an offer of talks with Maskhadov and his followers.

The second Western approach should be to Maskhadov and his representatives in the West, like Ahmed Zakayev, who has been given political asylum in Britain. They should be reminded firmly that when they formed a Chechen government in 1996 to 99, they failed utterly to foster even minimal elements of a state in Chechnya, to protect foreign citizens there or to prevent Chechnya being used as a base by anti-Western extremists. Their credibility as would-be rulers of an independent Chechnya is zero.

Any thought of Chechen independence must therefore be deferred until a solid basis for Chechen statehood has been created. In return for Western support for Chechen democracy and their own amnesty and participation in the Chechen political process, Maskhadov and his followers must accept autonomy for Chechnya within the Russian Federation as a short-to-medium-term solution and promise to struggle for long-term independence by exclusively peaceful and political means.

They must also commit themselves not only to break absolutely with the terrorists, but to fight against them alongside Russian forces. If they fail to make this commitment, they should be treated by the West as terrorist supporters.

Finally, the West should back such a settlement with the promise of a really serious aid package for Chechnya’s reconstruction, calibrated so as to reward supporters of peace, and of Western special forces to help Russia in the fight against the terrorists.

It may be argued of course that such a commitment is utterly unrealistic, given the contemptible failure of Western countries even to meet their formal obligations to liberated Afghanistan. But then again, if Western governments and societies are not prepared to give real help to Chechnya, how much is their moralizing talk about the situation there really worth?

The BBC are streaming a copy of a video recorded inside the school at Beslan, probably early on in it siege. It seems to depict the number of explosives present, and how many hostage takers/murderers in the gym.

So amidst all the tragedy in North Ossetia, a Georgian film crew was captured by…the Russian Security Services? Surely not during the funerals of hundreds of Ossetian, slaughtered as they were by terrorist murderers? Yes, and the FSB are acting pretty strange about it too. Putin seems to be gunning for a showdown with Georgia and Chechnya.

This is pretty mad stuff. The Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili went on television to demand the return of the journalists. The two hacks work for the more independent station in Georgia, and the region, Rustavi-2, which is actually available in a live streamin on the Internet. The station has reporting on the situation here and here, and are blaming Russian political motives - which is all too likely given the recent skirmishes in South Ossetia. You can watch the latest news in Real Player if you click the Live link.

Rustavi’s reaction:

The Rustavi2 Broadcasting Company is highly concerned by the detention of its correspondent, Nana Lezhava and the cameraman, Levan Tetvadze by the Russian law-enforcers in Beslan.

The authorities of the company are strongly convinced that the detention of Nana Lezhava had nothing to do with the “active behavior” on her part as the Russian law-enforcers, and, unfortunately, some Russian media agencies call it.

The Rustavi2 authorities deem the detention of Nana Lezhava and Levan Tetvadze as an illegal act as both of the journalists had all the necessary legal documents which allowed them to cross the border to cover the events in Beslan.

Several members of the Rustavi2 staff have launched a protest demonstration in front of the Russian embassy in Tbilisi. They have already been joined by other media representatives who came to show sympathy for their colleagues unfairly detained in Beslan.

This appears to be yet more provocation by the Russians, even after the events in Beslan.

Neal Ascherson writing in the IHT discusses the other problem in the Caucasus: Abkazia. While the world’s media has been focused on the school siege in North Ossetia, and the related Chechen problem, is has paid almost no attention to the brewing problems in either South Ossetia or Abkazia.

Neal writes in depth about the upcoming elections in the province, and the likely problems facing Saakashvili. He concludes however:

But Saakashvili and the new Abkhaz president will face two obstacles. One is how to let the refugees return without overbalancing Abkhazia’s demography. The other is gaining Russian approval. That is even harder. As American influence in the region grows, with huge U.S. investments in Caspian oil and trans-Caucasus pipelines, Russia’s instinct is to hold on to any lever in its grasp - including the military presence in Abkhazia that gives Moscow a decisive grip on Georgian policies.

In the end, it is not Georgians or Abkhazians who will solve this dangerous standoff. Only a global agreement between Russia and the United States on the future of the Caucasus will end Abkhazia’s isolation and bring Georgia and Abkhazia to a lasting settlement.

It is a region worth watching closely.

Salih Brandt, a former European spokesman for the Chechen government, made some curious remarks on This Week today. Roisin Duffy was even a little shocked. You can listen to him being interviewed here.

But I have gone to the trouble of transcribing the most curious bit:

Salih Brandt: In the background of this you have to look at that Russia is in a situation where the government is becoming increasingly sort of KGB/FSB orientated. And it’s not without reason that Vladimir Putin is fighting a campaign in his country to regain control of the resources of that country. Now there are a list of eight/nine/ten, all of them Jewish, oligarchs, who have ripped the wealth out of the country over the last ten years. Now if Yukos, facing a back tax bill of $4.1 billion, that’s $4.1 billion dollars that Vladimir Putin did not have at his disposal for insuring the security of his population. And that money has come out of the country and is being used to play football in Europe. And this is something people need to look at very closely. I have to sympathise with Vladimir Putin in that sense, he has limited resources to deal with. And the result of that is for the price of 7 dollars, you bribe your way with a bomb past a security guard in Russia.

Roisin Duffy: That’s a horrific allegation Salih Brandt thanks for joining us.

I was just a little shocked by the allegation too. A quick look around the Internet revealed this study by Dr. Betsy Gidwitz at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. It notes:

That Jews control a disproportionately large share of the Russian economy and Russian media certainly has some basis in fact. Between 50 and 80 percent of the Russian economy is said to be in Jewish hands, with the influence of the five Jews among the eight individuals commonly referred to as “oligarchs” particularly conspicuous. (An oligarch is understood to be a member of a small group that exercises control in a government. The five oligarchs of Jewish descent are Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Friedman, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexander Smolensky. The other oligarchs are Vagit Alekperov, Vladimir Potanin, and Rem Vyakhirev.)

And the reason for the disproporationate share?

How did the oligarchs achieve their power? Here we must review Soviet history and Soviet antisemitism. All of these individuals were born in the postwar years. Berezovsky, in his mid-50s, is the oldest among them. Antisemitism had closed off positions in government and industry to most Jews during the Soviet period. Typically, energetic Jews found outlets in academic institutions (second-tier if they were bright, first-tier if they were brilliant and lucky); culture (Gusinsky had been a theater director); medicine; engineering; and as tradesmen, such as repairmen and dressmakers.

Because advertising was forbidden in the Soviet Union, skilled trades people turned to unofficial brokers (fartsovshchiky) who could obtain key items, such as tools or spare parts, that were “in deficit,” i.e., in short supply. Other brokers could find gifted surgeons for private patients or arrange stays at elite vacation resorts. Many of these brokers were Jews.

A similar field of work on a larger scale was that of a tolkach, an expediter or fixer in industry. These were the underground wheelers and dealers who performed vital roles in addressing the failures of the centrally planned Soviet economy. They found the raw materials that the behemoth central planning system had lost, they arranged transportation links, they cleared bottlenecks. Most had the protection offered by a conventional job, perhaps as an engineer, but their wheeling and dealing skills became known and every competent factory manager had at least one on the payroll.

When Mikhail Gorbachev permitted the development of cooperatives and private trade as components of his perestroika policy in 1987, the expediters were well-positioned to step forward. Many of them fashioned their contacts together into cooperatives. Within a short time, the cooperatives developed into conglomerates.

The non-Jewish oligarchs, on the other hand, acquired their assets through earlier positions in government agencies that provided insider contacts. The three named individuals all held key posts in the former Soviet economic apparatus - such as the Ministry of Energy and Fuel, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or in the Soviet State Bank - positions that were closed to Jews. One is the son of a prominent Soviet diplomat. Simply stated, the non-Jews just took personal control of industrial sectors for which they had had prior public supervisory responsibilities.

And if it was Jews who made the money, more power to them. If it was Christians who became the Oligarchs would we hear the same kind of statement? Is Brandt saying that all Jews are tax-dodgers? Why not just say that Jews are the cause of all of Russia’s problems? Brandt is making an outlandish and perhaps racist statement. The fact that some, though not all, of the oligarchs are Jewish really has no bearing. The situation with Yukos is just a little more complex than what Putin or the State-owned media would have us believe to be plain old tax evasion. In fact to think that the Yukos situation is only a tax evasion issue is just plain silly.

And then to blame a lack of Russian resources on Jews not paying their taxes strikes me as, well, crap.

I have been following events in North Ossetia, as my readers know, I follow events in this region with a keen interest. South Ossetia was recently the scene of some skirmishes with Georgian troops, a situation that is likely to flare up again in the near future.

It now seems that these Chechens in North Ossetia have given Putin something of an excuse to do whatever the hell he likes in Chechnya. I think it would be fair to say that Putin has some racist tendencies, many of my Russian and Georgian friends believe him to be racist, and he most especially despises Chechens (and Jews purportedly), much like Stalin in previous years.

What now? Expect reprisals, but not very well publicised ones.

Dan Drezner ads his two cents, and believes that Saakashvili is a good leader.

Screw Bush or Kerry — why can’t someone like Mikheil Saakashvili run for president in the United States? As someone who witnessed first-hand the Soviet-style traffic police in action when living in Ukraine, I could only weep with joy after reading C.J. Chivers’ account in the New York Times of Saakashvili’s police reforms.

Nice to see this region mentioned on one of the bigger blogs.

Georgia has begun withdrawing troops from the conflict zone in South Ossetia a day after it claimed to have captured key strategic positions in the area. It is handing over control to a joint peacekeeping force composed of Russian, Ossetian and Georgian soldiers.

Events move fast.

Looks like Georgia may be getting cold feet, as the prospect of more conflict looms. But it appears that this might not be the end of things:

Mr Saakashvili called his offer “the last chance for peace” in South Ossetia. A ceasefire deal reached last Friday has now been violated for five nights in a row, as pro-Russian South Ossetian separatists battle Georgian troops.

The report continues with a quote from Saakashvili:

“We are ready to hand over control of these positions to the tripartite peacekeeping contingent, which also includes Georgians, and leave 500 of our select fighters under our peacekeeping force quota to protect Georgian villages against attacks and possible acts of provocation,” he said.

“We are also ready to withdraw from all other positions and redeploy our forces outside the conflict zone in Gori.”

Mr Saakashvili said Georgia had sent extra troops to South Ossetia to combat smuggling, and this had “prompted vicious attacks on this contingent”.

The Georgian authorities say their troops killed eight South Ossetian fighters in the latest overnight fighting. The claim has not been confirmed.

Mr Saakashvili has said the international community should play an active role in peace talks. He called on world leaders to hold a conference on the future of South Ossetia and send Western peacekeepers to the region.

As readers may know the town of Gori is the home of a man that went by the name of Stalin. Saakashvili is playing a dangerous game here, the situation is becoming more and more fragile. Georgian troops on Ossetian land, even under the tripartite agreement could further enrage Ossetians. All of this comes on the back of reported heaving shelling in and around Tskhinvali last night.

Yet another piece in the IHT on the Georgian situation. Eugene’s advice to Saakashvili:

For reunification to happen, Abkhazia and South Ossetia will have to be guaranteed utmost autonomy within the new Georgia, without it actually crossing the line to sovereignty. And Saakashvili will have to give up some of his ambitions temporarily in order to please Russia. For example, he has openly and repeatedly said he wants to join NATO. This deeply offends the Russians - and it sounds hypocritical to them when, in the same breath, Saakashvili insists that no foreign military power should have the right to station its bases, or its troops, on Georgian soil. Russia still maintains two bases in Georgia, and it is unlikely to remove them if it knows that NATO might put a base of its own in their place.

For now, the best solution for Saakashvili is to pursue the path of democracy. If the young president can ensure continued free and fair elections, curb corruption and improve his people’s standard of living, Western institutions will invite his country to join them - not the other way around - and foreign aid will find its way to his doorstep.

When that moment comes, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may still refuse to reunite with Georgia - only this time, the loss will be theirs.

CJ Chivers with his take on current events in Georgia. Like most people, he believes in Russian interference, but is also wary of how the Georgian President has heightened tensions by insisting on the return of the two renegede provinces to Tblisi control.

The stakes are unmistakably high. Russia and the United States have competing interests in the region, a strategic intersection of Asia and Europe, and Russia has been openly supporting the separatists. One Russian newspaper has compared Saakashvili to Fidel Castro, a leader of a tiny nation who has been giving larger powers sleepless nights.

Why Saakashvili risked inflaming tensions with references to violence remains an open question. But now that he has everyone paying attention again, a simple question surrounds him: What will he do next? Saakashvili, for his part, speaks with the air of destiny. In a meeting with journalists and analysts on Aug. 10, he said it was inevitable that the republics would return to Georgia.

He noted that because both are within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders, no other outcome can be acceptable.

“It’s not only about Georgia,” he said. “It’s about world order.”

And in relation to recent events reported by the BBC, it seems that they may be not reporting some things that the local TV channel, Rustavi-2 are. Georgians have informed me that 4 soldiers and 8 civilans were killed on the Georgian side, whether that’s true or not has yet to be verified.

Things seem to be descending into chaos in and around South Ossetia.

Heavy fighting has broken out in Georgia’s South Ossetia region, shattering a two-day ceasefire. Two Georgian soldiers died as their base in the village of Eredvi came under attack from South Ossetian separatist forces early on Monday. The ceasefire was agreed on Friday between Tbilisi and South Ossetia, which wants to join Russia. Georgian Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili said there would be no more talks following the recent attacks.

This sounds like a powderkeg just waiting to go off. The Ossetians are brave only because they have the backing of Russia. Warning to the international community: this could have huge consquences, perhaps even more so given the oil pipline being built through Georgia.

Yet more news from Georgia:

Georgia’s parliament has called for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from the breakaway region of South Ossetia.
The number of clashes has increased in recent days, including an attack on Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania.

The Prime Minister’s convoy came under fire while he was doing a tour of villages neighbouring South Ossetia. This could be the work of Ossestian seperatists or even Russian soldiers, I wouldn’t be surprised.

I think Georgia is right to ask for the removal of Russian ‘peacekeepers’. They are hardly neutral in the affairs of Georgia and its provinces.

More strange goings-on in Georgia and South Ossetia. The question is who do we believe. I tend to believe the Georgians when they say things like

“external forces [planning] to drag Georgia into a large-scale armed conflict on its own territory”.

Or Russia to you and me.

The Ossetians are blaming Georgia for:

28 people had been injured, and a hospital and a kindergarten in Tskhinvali had been damaged by shelling along with 50 Ossetian homes.”All night they were firing from all types of weapons - mortars, artillery, everything was engaged,” one South Ossetian fighter told Russia’s Channel One Television.

You have to believe two things here. One, An Ossetian fighters claims, and two, a heavily Russian State-controlled TV station. And for State-controlled read Putin-controlled. And you also have to believe that the Georgians would start shelling and then just happen to hit a kindergarten and a hospital. Somewhat emotive targets don’t you think?

So do I believe Georgia when it says:

At least three Georgian villages were hit: Tamarasheni, Kurta and Achabeti. Speaking at a meeting of the Georgian Security Council, President Saakashvili confirmed that three Georgian peacekeepers had been killed.

That sounds much more believable to me. This could get ugly. Followers of Caucasian politics may also be interested to know that ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky visited the other breakaway region, Abkhazia. The BBC reported:

Accompanied by about 40 fellow MPs, Mr Zhirinovsky, a deputy speaker in the Russian parliament, arrived in the region’s capital, Sukhumi, for what he described as a holiday.

You have to like the Russians, they certainly have balls. A holiday my arse. As Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said, it was intended to provoke. Not only did Zhirinovsky and his pals visit Sukhumi, but they also decided to do so by ship, just a week after Georgian patrol boats fired on an Abkazian ship, while claiming jurisdiction over the waters off Abkazia.

Georgian coastguards initially impounded the boat in which he was travelling as it neared Abkhazia. It was later released, in what the Georgian authorities described as a gesture of goodwill.

Well what else could the Georgians do?

This all gets more and more intriguing

Is this man the godsend of Libertarians and free-market lovers everywhere? Could Georgia be the model for future economies? Or will it end up plunging into war with Russia?

None of my readers know it, but one of my pet subjects is Caucasian politics. I read about it regularly, and discuss it with some very nice Georgian people. I have picked up the odd bit of Russian and Georgian. Ravakha Bijou. [loose phonetics].

Here are some choice quotes for people that I know will like this guy, namely Frank.

He says that Georgia should be ready to sell �everything that can be sold, except its conscience�.

Next year�if not sooner�he will cut the rate of income tax from 20% to 12%, payroll taxes from 33% to 20%, value-added tax from 20% to 18%, and abolish 12 kinds of tax altogether. He wants to let leading foreign banks and insurers open branches freely. He wants to abolish laws on legal tender, so that investors can use whatever currency they want. He hates foreign aid�it �destroys your ability to do things for yourself,� he says�though he concedes that political realities will oblige him to accept it for at least the next three years or so.

As to where investors should put their money, �I don’t know and I don’t care,� he says, and continues: �I have shut down the department of industrial policy. I am shutting down the national investment agency. I don’t want the national innovation agency.� Oh yes, and he plans to shut down the country’s anti-monopoly agency too. �If somebody thinks his rights are being infringed he can go to the courts, not to the ministry.� He plans, as his crowning achievement, to abolish his own ministry in 2007. �In a normal country, you don’t need a ministry of the economy,� he says. �And in three years we can make the backbone of a normal country.�

The lesson he drew from the Russian experience, he says, is to change the method of privatisation, not the principle of it. He promises public sales to the highest bidder, and cash only: �no conditions, no promises, no beauty contests�.

Big improvements in business conditions are needed in order to offset big political risks and to keep investors coming. �Other governments make budgets,� he says. �We are making a nation.�