Gavin's Blog

There are a huge amount of conflicting reports about what exactly Russian troops are doing in Georgia. AP is reporting that “Troops waved at journalists and one soldier jokingly shouted to a photographer: “Come with us, beauty, we’re going to Tbilisi!”

Georgian and Russian officials appear to be denying it is a move towards Tbilisi. At last report, Russian troops were 12 miles from the capital.

If the EU is sending in troops peacekeepers, then it would want to do so soon.

Reading between the lines this statement is has a number of consequences. My reading of what he said is this: Threatening, bombing or taking Tbilisi International Airport (giving away some American, likely satellite, intelligence) is a Rubicon moment. If Russian forces act against the airport, it will be taken as crossing the Rubicon. Bush made no mention of likely consequences, and why should he?… it would be giving away his hand.

The message to Putin was clear: Withdraw, do not attack the airport, do not overthrow the Georgian government. Accept the EU-brokered ceasefire. Leaving the consequences of Russian rejection to the imagination is an entirely natural response.

The latest reports indicate that Russian forces have captured the Georgian airbase at Senaki, in Georgia proper. We have to ask why Russia is now pushing on, and what its strategy may be. We also have to question the media’s rather curious comparisons between Russia’s conventional military power, and that of Georgia.

Let’s take the second question first. The media have been making wildly odd comparisons between Russia’s military and that of Georgia. It is hardly valid to compare the two. We knew before the conflict began that Russia has one of the largest militaries in the world, and has recently been undergoing something of a revival under Putin. Georgia’s conventional forces are no match, and never were.

But even a cursory look at the CIA factbook page would tell an alternative story. The Russians face serious problems if they attempt to prolong the conflict. First is the Caucuses mountains themselves, second is the Georgian winter, third is the simple fact of almost 1,200,000 Georgian men between the ages of 16-49 who can fight. Even reducing this figure to men who have received the compulsory 18 months military service would still leave several hundred thousand men, fighting with the simple motive of defending their homeland. There is also the fact that Georgian households invariably have one or two assault weapons each, in what is by Western European standards a rather militarised society. If worse comes to worse, these are men willing to fight, who know the territory and how to use it. A guerilla war would be easily fought by Georgia, and prove hugely taxing on Russian forces in the region. As StragetyPage notes:

Until a few years ago the “reserves” constituted the entire body of conscripts discharged over the past 15 years. But this pool, of about 250,000 men, was just that, a pool. The “reservists” were not subject to periodic refresher training, and so no more than perhaps 10 percent of them could be considered useful in the event of activation. Beginning four years ago, Georgia instituted a more rigorous reserve training program. An active reserve has been created, which apparently numbers over 10,000 men, and is expected to grow to as many as 100,000 over the next few years, as conscripts (drafted at 18 to 18-24 months) leave active service, and enter 5-10 years of reserve duty.

While Georgia doesn’t have the money for modern equipment (it’s stuff is mostly Russian Cold War vintage), it does have enough professional soldiers from the old Red Army, and a military tradition going back centuries. Much to the discomfort of Russia, the United States has been supplying Georgia with military trainers and some equipment. Partly, this is in response to Georgian help in Iraq. Georgia first sent 800 peacekeepers to Iraq, and began increasing that force. Currently there are 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq, where they obtain useful operational experience.

That apart, Russia is asking for trouble if it continues on its current path. There is a reason the Russian Empire could never control Georgia, and a reason the Russian language is not the first one. Geography is one of the main reasons, the Georgian people are another.

So what is Russia doing? Demonstrating its new found military strength. Taking no shit from Georgia. Ignoring the international community. Using the language of its US: “We bombed Gori because the Georgian forces were using civilian infrastructure as cover to launch attacks on us.”, “Our peace enforcement mission is seeking to protect Ossetians…”. And this is how it is played to the Russian population. No doubt many Russians are delighted at this new found military projection of power.

But will Russia escalate it to a point, and then wait and see, or will it push on? It’s hard to say. To me it seems they have achieved whatever objectives they set out to attain, and any further push into Georgia would be counter productive.

Read: Zbigniew Brzezinski’s interview in HuffPo.

Civil Georgia has been under cyber attack, it has now moved to blogspot.

Charlie Whitaker has a similar roundup to myself.

Steve has good links and analysis here and here.

Oh and have a look through my Caucasian Politics archive, I have posts on Ossetia and Abkhazia going back four years.

Russia-Georgia is a Georgian blog about the conflict.

Russia has bombed the town of Gori, one close to the hearts of every Georgian because of its connection to Soso Dzhugashvili (Stalin). As I said yesterday, the next 24 hours would define how things go. The escalation by Russia has confirmed that.

I had a long chat with Cian last night where we talked about what next for Saakashvili. We tried to come up with what might happen over the coming days. I argued that Saakashvili has long wanted Ossetia back in Georgian control and it appeared that he tried to take it, and miscalculated on the Russian response. He is trying to use the language of diplomacy, while at the same time mobilising the country.

But the best he can hope for is a return to the status quo. George Bush iterated that position today. Saakashvili’s most recent calls for a ceasefire hints at his willingness to return to that status quo.

Alternatively Russian troops will stay within the borders of South Ossetia, with a high level of UN involvement from here on. Since the stakes are now much higher, Saakashvili can assume there will be greater international attention for the problem, confirmed by Poland calling for an emergency EU meeting.

With Abkhazia now becoming a feature of the conflict though, it will become increasingly difficult to step back from the brink. The next few days are critical, if international pressure is not put on both sides to stop the escalation in violence then it could get out of control. Georgians are fiercely proud and nationalistic people, and if Russia provokes its general populace it could lead to a very violent conflict.

Whatever about the might of the Russian military machine, Russia will be loathe to get bogged down in Georgia, it would be a fight that would be worth little, and lead to high financial cost and loss of life.

The international community appears relatively quiet thus far, and this is dangerous. Hostilities must cease within the next few days, or the chance for a return to the status quo will be lost.

Here is a US military video detailing the training of Georgian forces in recent years:

Firstly, the conflict and how it started. The Georgians are saying Russia launched a “full scale invasion”. Russia is saying Ossetia is defending itself against Georgian aggression. Who do I believe right now? Georgia. The volume of Russian units entering Georgia is significant and pre-planned. It’s also mid August, a perfect time for action given the intensity of the Georgian winter in the northern mountains. The news wires simply report that Georgia tried to retake the whole province, and Russia reacted.

Saakashvili was just on Bloomberg, his “favourite channel”, explaining the situation. Georgia has shot down “eight Russian planes” (AP say two). Georgia is now in full scale defensive mode. He said it is mobilising its entire armed forces in defence, and that the simple situation is that Georgia is defending herself. Saakashvili looked rattled to say the least. Georgia will always say it is defending its territory when it comes to Ossetia, because it sees the province as its own. So Russian operations within Ossetia are considered aggressive by default.

Russia is playing the usual game. Putin is saying he’s very sad that Georgia has started a conflict on the day of the start of the Olympics, a day “when guns should be silent”. The timing is certainly curious, the news agenda is directed at China today of all days. If it had been any other day, Georgia would have gotten all the coverage.

But just going on the television pictures of Russian Frogfoot (which incidentally are manufactured in Georgia), BMP-2/3, BTR-60s fighting and entering Ossetia, this was well planned. The conflict has been going on for some days, but it has just recently escalated. There are also pictures of large convoys of Russian T-80s entering Ossetia.

Apparently the Georgians have captured the capital of Ossetia, Tskhinvali, and Russian troops are going in that direction.

Medvedev is saying the “Georgian assault” is a violation of international law. Saakashvili is saying the same about Russia. Of course the Russians are also saying the US is behind the conflict.

Who do you trust though? Neither of them really, but the rhetoric of Russia strikes me as disingenuous at the least. Georgia’s story seems more plausible.

What happens next? Russia is pouring tanks and troops into Ossetia, and Georgia is mobilising its entire armed forces. Anything could happen.

Worst case? The entire caucuses, a melting pot of ethnic tensions is plunged into conflict. As you can see from this map, it is a mess of various rival ethnic groups. Some of the conflicting borders don’t feature on this map either.

Update 13.16: Russia is reported to be bombing an airbase just outside Tblisi. If true, it means we are in a de facto state of war.

Update: 13.17: Saakashvhili is on CNN saying that “this is the worst nightmare one can encounter”, and Russia is refusing to enter talks. Troops have been amassing at the border for 3 or 4 months, undertaking military exercises, and have now decided to cross the border. What should the West do now? “Wake up!”. It is interesting to note he is flanked by the Georgian flag on one side and the European flag on the other. He is even pointing out the timing of the attack, to coincide the Olympics. He denies trying to retake South Ossetia. “We would be suicidal to initiate anything on our own.” “Last night Russian APCs crossed the border…”. What would you ask Bush to do? “We are in the same situation Finland was in 1939, same as Afghanistan in 1979…”

13.41: It is interesting to watch the wire agencies catch up with this story. I timed the pictures from Russia Today of T-80 columns entering Ossetia, it took about 45 mins for news agencies to realise Russia was essentially invading.

14.25: I just got off the phone with a Georgian friend. He is a critic of Saakashvili and blames him entirely for the escalation. He reckons he miscalculated in an effort to retake South Ossetia and that Russia is reacting naturally to the situation. By his estimation the conflict will die down within days, if not hours, as Georgia gets punished for its misbehaviour. “It all depends on what happens in the next 24 hours,” he said. He lambasted Saakashvili for breaking his own ceasefire this morning.

14.52: Richard Holbrooke is on BBC News, in hawkish terms. “This is a very sad day for the Western alliance.” He said it amounted to the annexation of South Ossetia. He also pointed out that Russia make this opportunity to move on the other region, Abkhazia (That region is a far more close to the hearts of Georgians than Ossetia. The war in 1993 was hard fought in Abkhazia). “The future of Russia’s relations with the West are involved, this is a very big deal.”

15.01: The Economist, which has some of the best coverage of Georgian affairs, has an update.

The New York Times reports here.

15.17: Reports of 100s of civilians killed. This could easily get out of hand. It’s important to remember that just about every household in Georgia have at least one AK-47, and they are not afraid to use them.

15.38: Russia Today (very very biased), in quotes from Russian officials, are using words like “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”. They are also reporting 1,000 civilians killed. This rhetoric will only fuel things.

15.43: Saakashvili is on BBC News. Rice called him “several times”. Sarkozy called him. “Sarkozy had a tough conversation with Vladimir Putin.”

Saakashvili using words like annexation. “Georgia wants peace and development, the last thing we need is trouble.” “If we get attacked, democracies have to defend itself (sic)”. Points to Holbrooke’s words earlier, says he understands the situation. “It is not about us anymore”… it is about freedom and democracy.

18.42: Georgia has said they are withdrawing 1,000 troops from Iraq to redeploy in Georgia. They say they now control most of South Ossetia. Up to 30 Georgian troops have been killed.

22.19: Bloomberg are reporting that Putin has said “war has started”. There are reports of heavy street fighting in the Ossetian capital. Georgia is saying civilian infrastructure is being bombed.

Abkhazia is claiming that an L-39 shot down the Georgian drone. The video clearly shows a Mig 29. The giveaway feature is the twin vertical stabilisers at the rear of the plane. The L-39 only has one.

A Russian military official denied a Russian Mig was in the area at the time.

Given that the bomb did not explode, and given the history, it seems to me more likely that Russia did not attack Georgia – but that Georgia planned the whole thing. Georgia would have the means and the motive to create this situation – it seems far too strange for two Russian jets to drop a malfunctioning bomb on another sovereign state for no apparent reason.

The ructions over South Ossetia continue. What is going on?

The latest clash is over South Ossetia, one of two Georgian regions that fought their way to unofficial secession in the 1990s. There have been fisticuffs and tit-for-tat blockades between Georgian troops and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Last week, Georgia’s parliament, accusing Russia of annexing its territory, called for Russian troops to get out. (As in Abkhazia, the other enclave, most South Ossetians now have Russian passports.) In retaliation for visa requirements imposed on Russian troops, the Russian embassy in Tbilisi stopped issuing visas to Georgians.

There are two interpretations of this vitriol. One is that, accustomed to brinkmanship as both sides are, neither really means it. Both understand the need to play to a domestic gallery. That may be true of some Georgians—diplomats point out there were no ultimatums in the Ossetian resolution—but feelings in the Kremlin seem authentically bilious. Hence the other possibility, that the Georgians are miscalculating.

Like other small countries, Georgia is used to seeing its fate decided elsewhere. Zurab Noghaideli, the prime minister, says his government knows its problems must be solved by itself above all; but its strategy seems to be to attract as much attention as possible in America and Europe. That may be based on an inflated idea of how willing outsiders are to take up Georgia’s cause. They may be even less willing should the imperfections of Mr Saakashvili’s regime become still more pronounced (even though Ms Zourabichvili’s talk of “creeping totalitarianism” is exaggerated).

Ms Zourabichvili says that, should disappointment with the current course set in, the paradoxical outcome might be to drive Georgia back towards Russia. Meanwhile, the Kremlin could make life even tougher. Russian officers say that if they leave (unlikely, at least for now), there could be a new conflict in South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, who visited neighbouring Azerbaijan this week, has compared Georgia’s enclaves to Kosovo.

Given Russia’s problems in Chechnya, self-determination might seem an odd principle for the Kremlin to espouse; but their problem, say the Russians, is terrorists, not separatists. “Some people just don’t know where the borders of the Russian Federation end,” says Mr Saakashvili. Unfortunately for him, the status quo in the enclaves—power to make trouble, with no responsibility—suits Russia nicely. The risk is that war may come to seem the only way forward.

The caucasus destabilising poses a huge threat to Western interests too. Any war, even small scale, would have serious regional affects. The mix of Iranian gas and oil, Azeri oil, Caspian oil, the BTC oil pipeline, Turkey, Chechnya, ethnic and religious strife – it’s a potent mix indeed.

Amongst people that I have met from the former Soviet Union, most especially those from Georgia, Stalin is a figure that is applauded in Soviet history. I have had very interesting conversations with Georgians about the legacy of Stalin, and most say that what Russia needs now is another ‘man of steel’, to bring the country back into line. They tend not to beat around the bush when it comes to some of Stalin’s exploits. Of the 1944 deportation of almost the entire Chechen population to Siberia Georgians seem to have little sympathy, an Orthodox country surrounded by Islamic ones lends little support for Islamic populations. And of all the other people exterminated by Stalin, Geogians usually seem to say that they deserved it as they were ‘criminals’.

It all makes this article in Foreign Affairs more interesting. I have puzzled over the lack of resentment for Stalin among all of the former Soviet Union, Sarah Mendelson and Theordore Gerber write about polls carried out in the former Soviet Union over the last few years, it makes for startling reading, especially among younger people:

The rule, therefore, seems to be thorough ambivalence about Stalin among Russia’s youth. Although some people might take comfort in the finding that hard-core Stalinism is not widespread, such ambivalence is itself disturbing. It suggests that Russia badly needs a systematic de-Stalinization campaign — a need that is growing increasingly urgent. Our survey data suggest that young people’s attitudes toward Stalin are, if anything, becoming more positive: in 2005, nearly 19 percent of respondents said they would definitely or probably vote for him, up from 13 percent in 2003 and 2004.

The article suggests solutions, education being the main one, but in Putin’s Russia this appears to be a problem:

Western cheerleaders of Russian President Vladimir Putin are likely to dismiss positive Russian attitudes toward Stalin as a minor growing pain or a speed bump on the country’s road to democracy — just as they downplay the carnage in Chechnya; the festering, potentially explosive conflict throughout the North Caucasus; the Kremlin’s blatant suppression of independent television outlets and nongovernmental organizations that dare to challenge its official line; the sorry state of Russia’s disintegrating military; the predatory and ineffective police; and the massive corruption at all levels of Russian government.

Such willful blindness is dangerous. But so is the opposite perspective of some pessimistic Russia-watchers, who take Russians’ ambivalence toward Stalin as evidence of an authoritarian gene embedded somewhere in the Russian character. In fact, the Russian public’s attitude toward Stalin is neither innocuous (and thus not worth changing) nor inherent (and thus immutable). Our surveys suggest that Russian attitudes toward Stalin owe not to any instinctive authoritarianism, but to the fact that no concerted, effective de-Stalinization campaign has ever been conducted in the country. On the contrary, myths and illusions about Russia’s great dictator have been allowed to survive, and even thrive, often with tacit (if not explicit) encouragement from the government.

Will Stalin be rememberd by his people as a great and wise leader, or as a murderous tyrant?

It could be political or criminal, you never know in this region:

Near-simultaneous blasts rocked three slot machine halls in the Russian Caucasus town Vladikavkaz on Thursday, killing two people, the local Emergencies Ministry said.

There was no word on what had caused the blasts in the gaming parlors, which are popular across Russia after gambling was outlawed in Soviet times.

“Thirteen people are injured and two people have died,” a spokesman said.

Russian news agencies reported most casualties were young people in their 20s and there were some children among the injured.

Vladikavkaz is in North Ossetia, the same region where Chechen militants took a school in Beslan hostage in September 2004, resulting in the deaths of 331 people, more than half of them children.

What would have been the consequences had the grenade gone off?

A Georgian man has been sentenced to life in prison for throwing a grenade at a rally attended by US President George W Bush in Tbilisi last May.

Vladimir Arutyunian was found guilty on charges including terrorism, treason, attempted assassination and the killing of a police officer, the judge said.

The grenade landed 30m (100ft) from Mr Bush and the Georgian leader, who were standing behind bullet-proof glass.

Rather large protests indeed, but not as many as the opposition expected – they say thanks to police intimidation.

The government of President Ilham Aliyev allowed the opposition to stage a three-hour rally in the outskirts of the capital, Baku. Election officials have ordered re-runs in two districts and one recount.

About 15,000 protesters attended the march and rally, many wearing or waving orange flags in a reference to the success of the “orange revolution” that brought President Victor Yushchenko to power in Ukraine after disputed elections.

The numbers fell far short of the 30,000 to 50,000 the opposition had hoped for.

This could fester.

Elections in Azerbaijan have led to the reinstatement of the existing leader Ilham Aliev. It appears though, that the elections were far from fair. It is what you might expect from Azerbaijan. The Economist reports:

One campaign has involved decrees on electoral propriety from Ilham Aliev, Azerbaijan’s president, the open registration of candidates, plans for exit-polling and the release of political prisoners. Beneath these niceties, however, lies another campaign that has alarmed foreign election and human-rights observers. This one features the beating and detention of opposition candidates and their supporters, media bias, and bizarre allegations of a coup plot that followed a mysteriously aborted homecoming by an exiled opposition leader. This election may yet be judged to have been little cleaner than the rigged presidential poll in 2003, when Mr Aliev succeeded his father Heidar, a Soviet-era boss who ran the country again for the last decade of his life.

Some facts on Azerbaijan for general interest:

Azerbaijan has more people (8m), and most are Muslims. It is in a rough neighbourhood: to the north is Dagestan, an anarchic region of Russia; to the south, Iran. It lost a chunk of its territory in a war with Armenia in the 1990s, and the two countries may yet fight another. Above all, it has oil and gas: new pipelines will soon carry both from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. And, like its election, Azerbaijan has two faces. It is a proud, booming nation with a westernised elite and a glamorous capital, Baku; it is also grotesquely corrupt, beset by clan rivalries, its bureaucrats fattening on backhanders while 40% of the country lives in poverty.