Category: Caucasian Politics

Trouble in the Caucasus, Kabardino-Balkaria is one of the may enclaves in the region, as this Economist graphic shows.

Indeed the Economist piece back in February discussed the instability of the region.

IN ANY other European country, the carnage would have caused horror. But ten years of war in Chechnya have inured most Russians to the fates of desperadoes such as the obscure Islamist group that two weeks ago holed up in an apartment in Nalchik, the capital of the north Caucasian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. A three-day siege ended bloodily: the apartment was gutted, and its seven occupants, alleged perpetrators of a murderous attack on a government agency in December, were all killed.

Still, the location of this particular last stand was troubling. Kabardino-Balkaria had until recently been a patch of relative calm in Russia’s poorest, angriest and most complex region. So too, until last October, had seemed Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria’s western neighbour. Then seven businessmen were killed, and their bodies thrown down a mine. The son-in-law of the republic’s president was implicated in the murders, and a mob stormed the presidential headquarters in Cherkessk, the capital.

And indeed it warned back then:

In Ingushetia and North Ossetia, people whisper about unknown bearded men turning up at mosques. Mass unemployment helps to make militancy seem like a good career option. But while the threat may be growing, only a small minority dream of a north Caucasian caliphate. Many of the region’s problems have nothing to do with either religion or ethnicity.

The big risk is simply that more and more of the north Caucasus may slip into lawlessness and drift out of Moscow’s orbit. After his meddling in Ukraine, pundits talked of Mr Putin’s plans to reconstitute the Russian empire. But, in a sense, Russia is already its own empire. The possibility that it may one day crumble as the Soviet Union did is Mr Putin’s central fear. The neglect of the north Caucasus may eventually lead to that fear’s realisation.

We will have to wait and see who is behind the latest attacks.

Depressing news indeed:

A top human rights official in the Russian-backed administration in Chechnya says there are more than 50 mass graves in the troubled republic.

Nurdi Nukhazhiyev told the BBC that tens of thousands of civilians had “disappeared” since 1999.

Whither the international outcry?

So it was finally finished this week, though it will take 6 months for the oil to go from one end to the other. At full capacity the pipeline will provide 1% of the world’s oil needs. The Economist notes the significance:

The BTC pipeline, though the most expensive option for exporting Caspian oil, was backed by America because it avoided Russia, thereby reducing the dependence of the Caucasus and Central Asia on Russian pipelines. The pipeline also provided an opportunity to bolster regional economies that the West is courting, especially those of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, a NATO ally, and build support for America in the region. Georgia’s location gives it a “strategic importance far beyond its sizeâ€?, according to America’s State Department.

Upgrading an alternative route through Georgia to Supsa on the Black Sea would have made for a far shorter (and cheaper) pipeline. But Turkey complained that it would lead to an unsustainable level of shipping passing through the Bosporus Strait that bisects Istanbul. At Washington’s urging, the BTC pipeline wended its complex way through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. However, some critics of the pipeline point out that the oil revenues provided to Azerbaijan will help to prop up the country’s autocratic and corrupt regime. And environmentalists have complained that the pipe slices through a national park in Georgia.

I failed to give sufficient space towards the Bush visit to Georgia – but I have been looking back at some of the coverage.

Bush’s warning to Putin, his host in Red Square only 24 hours before at the 60th anniversary celebration of the defeat of Nazi Germany, was focused on two separatist enclaves within Georgia’s borders – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – that are aligned with Russia.

Earlier in the day, at a joint news conference with Saakashvili in the Parliament building, Bush embraced the Georgian president’s plan that the enclaves become autonomous and self-governing, but not independent. He approvingly said that Saakashvili “wants the country to remain intact.”

Bush’s words were immediately criticized by the president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, who told the Interfax news agency that “the Abkhaz people have already opted for an independent state at a referendum and this choice should be respected.”

Bush took a careful stance on the biggest conflict right now between Russia and Georgia, the two Russian military bases on Georgian soil that the Georgians want removed. The two countries are in negotiations, but Saakashvili boycotted the 60th anniversary celebration in Red Square to protest a lack of progress. Bush said at the news conference that he had spoken to Putin about the matter.

“He reminded me that there is an agreement in place – a 1999 agreement,” Bush said. “He said that the Russians want to work with the government to fulfill their obligations in terms of that agreement. I think that’s a commitment that’s important for the people of Georgia to hear. It shows there’s grounds to work to get this issue resolved.”

Some discussion is also happening over on Irish Eagle. I tend to agree with Peter on this one, Georgia is important to US interests – NATO or no NATO. Energy supplies from the Caspian that do not go through volatile central Asia, or Russia, but instead via friendly Georgia, Azerbaijan, and NATO ally Turkey are, in my estimation at least, hugely important. Besides that Georgia is in a strategically important area, gateway to Europe and the Middle East – its only a 200km trek to the Iranian border (where believe it or not many people speak Georgian).

I reckon Georgia is important enough for the US to maintain a presence there almost indefinately – whether it comes to war with Russia or not is hard to say – but Georgia is certainly seeking a security guarantee in the form of NATO membership. The regions of Abkazia and Ossetia are certainly a problem for Saaskashvili – he has more or less staked his Presidency on bringing them back into the fold. The Russian airbases in question are perhaps more important to Russia than it lets on, the same bases were some of the most important during the Cold War.

Georgia is getting alot of attention lately because of the Bush visit. Natalia Antelava for the BBC in Tblisi writes a rather uncritical report of the visit. Many Georgians I have spoken to are not only pissed off at the Bush visit, but are angry at Saakashvili. Natalia notes:

Yet Georgians do not seem to mind the fuss. “It’s great that he is coming. For a man like that, of such political prestige to come to our small country, that’s really outstanding. I and all my friends want to go and hear him speak,” said a student, Avtandil Murvanidze. “And we are getting a whole new beautiful city!” he added.

Is it me or does that make Georgians sound like uncritical plebs? Nowhere in the article are criticsms of Saakashvili or Bush – criticisms many Georgians are making. As one of my friends noted:

“Pash-ole von Bush. Pash-ole von Saakashvili, chen bozo-shvili”.

That’s actually two languages – ‘Fuck off Bush’. ‘Fuck off Saakashvili’ in Russian. And then ‘chen bozo-shvili’ is ‘you son-of-a-bitch’ in Georgian.

Earlier this month, Eamonn put together a post along with a map of the Caucasus. He referred to an article in the Economist, a 3 page piece if I remember correctly, in which the details of criminal activity in the region were detailed. It is indeed a volatile region, but Georgia is definately a country I will be visiting. Whether I travel into neighbouring regions, or even the notorious Pankisi Gorge inside Georgia, is another question.

In recent weeks the blogosphere has been rife with sentiment surrounding the various demonstrations in countries that are not known for the democratic regimes. Georgia is often used as the first example, at least in the post-Soviet bloc of countries. Since then we have had Ukraine and now Kyrgyzstan. What many commentators are saying is that these demonstrations and revoltions are a product of Bush’s foreign policy, stemming in part from his invasion of Iraq.

Cheerleading such as that over at Instapundit leads to simplification – even down to the names of the revolutions – the ‘Rose’ revolution in Georgia, or the Orange revolutions elsewhere, or the ‘Cedar’ revolution in Lebanon. What I have found lacking thus far in these commentaries is a sense of perspective or scale.

It is barely a year since the Rose Revolution in Georgia, that put Mikhail Saakashvili in power. His regime is lauded as a center for democracy in an otherwise troubled region, and he is lauded as a Western-style statesman, keen on democratic reform. The US has been active in the country, training its troops, and contributing large sums of money to the economy. Of course there is the hugely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, which provides a valuable strategic alternative to pumping oil through Putin’s Russia.

But lest we forget, it is just over a year. A blip on the calendar. Many are too quick to judge, these events in Georgia and Ukraine, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan are in their infancy. If history has thought me anything it is that when events such as these happen, people are inclined to rush to either claim credit, or to say it reflects a wider thirst for democratic ideals first coined in Europe.

Only in 20 years will we be able to look back on any of these events and see their collective effect on global politics. Sure we can speculate now on why these events take place, but it will only be with the benefit of hindsight that we will actually be able to make a true assessment of what actually happened.

Take Georgia as an example. It is so often cited now as an example for peaceful democratic reform, that nobody dare say that something could go wrong. But is everything as rosey as we think it might be?

It appears that in the minds of Western pundits that once democracy has taken hold in a country such as Georgia, once a pro-Western reformer takes power, that it will be a natural steady road to Westernisation/democratisation. Drezner noted:

…events in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Georgia, are making me wonder if maybe, just maybe, we’re at the beginning of the fourth wave of democratization.

But is this the case?

I have over the last number of months, I have tried to detail reforms in that country, many of which are supported by the West. The inclusion of Georgian troops in coalition forces in Iraq is seen as keeping good relations with the US. The liberalisation of economics, crackdowns on corruption, these are all seen by the West as great endeavours for a former Soviet state, and indeed home of Stalin.

But everything is not going that great in Georgia. Just over a year into Saakashvili’s presidency and there is huge discontent with his leadership. There have been calls for him to resign, or for another revolution to take place. His problem is that he is seen as too Western. Georgian people are not Western, and many idealise the Soviet days, and desire a return to Communism. The most recent decisions by Saakashvili have proven hugely unpopular.

He has decided to ask all foreign embassies in Georgia to no longer give travel or work visas to Georgians. Remember that money coming from ex-patriots is Georgia’s lifeline to hard currency, without the country would go bankrupt. Last week Saakashvili announced that a new Bank Holiday would be held on a Muslim Holy day, in order to recognise Georgia’s tiny Muslim population. Both of these events have proved enormously controversial, with many calling for Saakashvili to be removed. My own sources tell me that discontent has led to outright anger and hatred for the President, with many saying he should either be killed or removed.

These are mere examples, but the point remains – democracy is never plain sailing even in well established ones in the West. But in countries such as these democracy is far from assured, nor is the desire for it certain. If in 5 years time we can look back and say that Bush was right in his foreign policy, with successfully spreading democracy then well and good, but we should not be judging these efforts until well after his successor has left office.

Jonathan Steele writes in the Guardian about Europe’s silence on the situation in Chechnya.

In short, Europe is replacing its old policy of publicly denouncing Russia over Chechnya. At the current session of the UN Human Rights Commission, the EU has not proposed a resolution this year. But, diplomats argue, the silence is not motivated by cynicism or “condemnation fatigue”, let alone agreement with Moscow that Chechnya is a front in the war on international terror. It is part of a new policy of constructive engagement.

The hope is that low-key offers of help by European governments, and support at the Council of Europe for Chechnya’s political forces to start a dialogue, could have a better chance of success. The policy is worth trying, but the risks are enormous. If it turns out that Russia is merely coopting the EU behind its brutal tactics of “Chechenisation”, the new strategy must be dropped.

In some chilling photos, the killing of Aslan Maskhadov, notorious Chechen leader, has been confirmed. The celebrations by Russia’s Dumas will likely be short-lived, Shamil Basayev will probably replace Maskhadov, and may already be planning retaliation.